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Abstract
This paper describes how the elements of the SP theory (Wolff, 2003a)
may be realised with neural structures and processes. To the extent that
this is successful, the insights that have been achieved in the SP theory-
the integration and simplification of a range of phenomena in perception
and cognition-may be incorporated in a neural view of brain function.
These proposals may be seen as a development of Hebb’s (1949) con-
cept of a ‘cell assembly’. By contrast with that concept and variants of
it, the version described in this paper proposes that any one neuron can
belong in one assembly and only one assembly. A distinctive feature of
the present proposals is that any neuron or cluster of neurons within a
cell assembly may serve as a proxy or reference for another cell assem-
bly or class of cell assemblies. This device provides solutions to many
of the problems associated with cell assemblies, it allows information to
be stored in a compressed form, and it provides a robust mechanism by
which assemblies may be connected to form hierarchies, grammars and
other kinds of knowledge structure.
Drawing on insights derived from the SP theory, the paper also de-
scribes how unsupervised learning may be achieved with neural structures
and processes. This theory of learning overcomes weaknesses in the Heb-
bian concept of learning and it is, at the same time, compatible with the
observations that Hebb’s theory was designed to explain.
1 Introduction
At its most abstract level, the SP theory (Wolff, 2003a, 2001, 2004) is intended
to model any kind of system for processing information, either natural or ar-
tificial. The theory is Turing-equivalent in the sense that it can model the
operation of a Universal Turing Machine (Wolff, 1999a) but, unlike earlier the-
ories of computing, the SP theory provides an account of a range of phenomena
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in perception and cognition, including the analysis and production of natural
language (Wolff, 2000), ‘fuzzy’ recognition of patterns and objects, probabilis-
tic kinds of reasoning, solving problems by reasoning and by analogy (Wolff,
1999b), and unsupervised learning (Wolff, 2003b). The theory also provides a
new perspective on a range of concepts in computing, logic and mathematics
(Wolff, 1999a, 2002a).
In work to date, the SP theory has been developed in purely abstract terms
without reference to the anatomy or physiology of neural tissue. The main
purpose of this paper is to consider possible ways in which the abstract concepts
that have been developed within the SP theory may be mapped on to structures
and mechanisms in the brain. To the extent that this is successful, we may
achieve a ‘neural’ version of the theory—called ‘SP-neural’—that inherits the
insights that are provided by the abstract version.
To anticipate a little, it is proposed that ‘patterns’ in the SP theory are
realised with structures resembling Hebb’s (1949) concept of a ‘cell assembly’.
By contrast with that concept:
• It is proposed that any one neuron can belong in one assembly and only
one assembly. However, any given assembly may be ‘referenced’ from other
assemblies somewhat in the same way that any given web page may be
referenced by URLs on other web pages.1 This device provides solutions to
many of the problems associated with cell assemblies, it allows information
to be stored in a compressed form, and it provides a robust mechanism
by which assemblies may be connected to form hierarchies, grammars and
other kinds of knowledge structure.
• The mechanisms for learning in SP-neural are significantly different from
the well-known principles of Hebbian learning. However, they are com-
patible with the observations that Hebb’s theory was designed to explain
and, at the same time, they provide explanations for observations that the
Hebbian theory is not able to explain.
The next section describes the SP theory in outline with just sufficient detail
for present purposes. Section 3 considers how the elements of the SP theory may
be realised with neural mechanisms. Section 4 considers a selection of issues that
arise in validating the proposals against empirical data and alternative theories.
Section 5 summarises explanatory benefits, empirical predictions and future
avenues for research.
2 Outline of the SP theory
In this section, the main elements of the SP theory are described with many
details omitted. The focus is on those aspects of the theory that are relevant to
the proposals that follow.
The SP theory is founded on two quasi-independent areas of thinking:
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• A long tradition in psychology that many aspects of perception and cog-
nition may be understood in terms of information compression (see, for
example, Attneave, 1954; Oldfield, 1954; Barlow, 1959, 1969; Wolff, 1988;
Chater, 1996, 1999).
• Principles of minimum length encoding2, pioneered by Solomonoff (1964);
Wallace and Boulton (1968); Rissanen (1978) and others, that focus on the
intimate connection that exists between information compression and the
inductive prediction of the future from the past (see also Li and Vita´nyi,
1997; Solomonoff, 1997).
In broad terms, the SP theory is conceived as an abstract system or model
that works like this. It receives ‘New’ data from its environment and adds
these data to a body of stored knowledge called ‘Old’. At the same time, it
tries to compress the information as much as possible by searching for full or
partial matches between patterns and merging or ‘unifying’ patterns or parts
of patterns that are the same. In the course of trying to compress information,
the system builds multiple alignments, as described below.
Generally speaking, New information may be equated with sensory informa-
tion but information within the system may sometimes play the same roˆle, as
described in Section 2.4, below.
2.1 Computer models
Two computer models of the SP system have been developed:
• SP61 is a partial realisation of the theory that builds multiple alignments
and calculates probabilities of multiple alignments but does not transfer
any information from New to Old: all its Old information must be supplied
by the user. This model, which is relatively robust and stable, is described
quite fully in Wolff (2000).
• SP70 realises all the main elements of the theory, including the transfer
of information from New to Old. This model, and its application to un-
supervised learning, is described in Wolff (2003b, 2002b). More work is
required to realise the full potential of this model.
2.2 A ‘universal’ format for knowledge
All information in the system is expressed as arrays or patterns of symbols,
where a symbol is simply a ‘mark’ that can be compared with any other symbol
to decide whether it is the ‘same’ or ‘different’. In work done to date, the focus
has been on one-dimensional strings or sequences of symbols but it is envisaged
that, at some stage, the ideas will be generalized to patterns in two dimensions.
This very simple ‘universal’ format for knowledge has been adopted with
the expectation that it would facilitate the representation of diverse kinds of
knowledge and their seamless integration. Notwithstanding the simplicity of
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the format, the processing mechanisms provided within the SP system mean
that it is possible to model such things as grammatical rules (with ‘context-
sensitive’ power), if-then rules, discrimination networks and trees, class-inclusion
hierarchies (with inheritance of attributes), and part-whole hierarchies. An
example will be seen in Section 2.3, below, and others may be found in the
sources cited above.
Another motive for adopting this format for knowledge is the observation
that much of our knowledge derives ultimately from sensory inputs, especially vi-
sion, and most sensory inputs map naturally on to sequences or two-dimensional
arrays. This idea sits comfortably with the observation that the cortex is, topo-
logically, a two-dimensional structure and that there is a relatively direct map-
ping between the retina and each of the areas of the visual cortex, between
the skin and the somatosensory cortex, and likewise for other senses. It seems
reasonable to suppose that this kind of mapping is a general feature of the way
the brain handles information.3
2.3 Building multiple alignments
The main elements of the multiple alignment concept as it has been developed
in this research are illustrated in the example presented here. For the sake of
clarity and to save space, this example is relatively simple. However, this should
not be taken to represent the limits of what the system can do. More complex
examples may be found in Wolff (2000) and the other sources cited above.
In any realistic case, the number of possible alternative alignments is far
too large to be searched exhaustively. It is necessary to use heuristic methods
that prune away large parts of the search space, trading accuracy for speed.
The SP61 and SP70 models both use forms of ‘hill climbing’ with measures of
compression to guide the search.
Given a New pattern representing the sentence ‘t h e c a t s l e e p s’
and a set of Old patterns representing grammatical rules, the SP system builds
multiple alignments like the one shown in Figure 1. The aim is to create multiple
alignments that allow the New pattern to be encoded economically in terms
of the Old patterns as described in Section 2.3.3, below. Out of the several
alignments that SP61 has built in this case, the one shown in Figure 1 is the
best.
By convention, the New pattern is always shown in row 0 of any alignment,
as can be seen in Figure 1. The Old patterns are shown in the rows below the
top row, one pattern per row. The order of the Old patterns across the rows is
entirely arbitrary and without any special significance.
A pattern like ‘< NP < D > < N > >’ in row 7 of the alignment expresses
the idea that a noun phrase (‘NP’) is composed of a determiner (‘D’) followed
by a noun (‘N’). In a context-free phrase-structure grammar, this would be
expressed with a rule like ‘NP → D N’.
If we ignore row 8, the whole alignment may be seen to achieve the effect of a
context-free parsing, dividing the sentence into its constituent words, identifying
‘t h e c a t’ as a noun phrase, marking each word with its grammatical class,
4
0 t h e c a t s l e e p s 0
| | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | | | | | | < Vstem 2 s l e e p > | 1
| | | | | | | | | |
2 | | | | | | < V Vs < Vstem > s > 2
| | | | | | | | | |
3 S Num ; < NP | | | | | | > < V | > 3
| | | | | | | | | | | |
4 | | | | | | | < Nstem 3 c a t > | | 4
| | | | | | | | | | | |
5 | | | | | | | < N Ns < Nstem > > | | 5
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
6 | | | | < D 0 t h e > | | | | | | 6
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
7 | | < NP < D > < N | > > | 7
| | | |
8 Num SNG ; Ns Vs 8
Figure 1: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘t h e c a t s l e e p s’ in New
and patterns representing grammatical rules in Old.
and, within the verb ‘s l e e p s’, marking the distinction between the stem
and the suffix. Ignoring row 8, the alignment in Figure 1 is equivalent to the
tree-structured parsing shown in Figure 2.
S
th e c a t s l e e p s
D N
NP
V
Vr
Figure 2: A tree-structured parsing equivalent to the alignment shown in Figure
1, excluding row 8.
2.3.1 Context-sensitive power
Although some of the patterns in the alignment are similar to rules in a context-
free phrase-structure grammar, the whole system has the expressive power of
a context-sensitive system. This is illustrated in row 8 of the alignment where
the pattern ‘Num SNG ; Ns Vs’ marks the ‘number’ dependency between the
singular noun in the subject of the sentence (‘c a t’) and the singular verb (‘s l e
5
e p s’). A basic context-free phrase-structure grammar, without augmentation,
cannot handle this kind of dependency.
2.3.2 ‘Identification’ symbols and ‘contents’ symbols
Within each pattern in Old, there is a distinction between identification (ID)
symbols and contents (C) symbols. The former serve to identify the pattern or
otherwise define its relationship with other patterns, while the latter represent
the contents or substance of the pattern.
For example, in the pattern ‘< NP < D > < N > >’ in row 7 of Figure 1,
the ID-symbols are the initial left bracket (‘<’), the symbol ‘NP’ that follows
it and the terminating right bracket (‘>’). All other symbols in the pattern are
C-symbols. In the pattern ‘< Nstem 3 c a t >’, the ID-symbols are the initial
and terminal brackets, as before, plus the symbols ‘Nstem’ and ‘3’, while the
C-symbols in that pattern are ‘c’, ‘a’ and ‘t’. In the pattern ‘Num SNG ; Ns
Vs’, the first three symbols are ID-symbols and the last two are C-symbols.
In SP61—which does not attempt any learning—the Old patterns are sup-
plied to the system by the user and each symbol within each Old pattern is
marked by the user to show whether it is an ID-symbol or a C-symbol. In
SP70—which creates patterns and adds them to Old in the course of learning—
the distinction between ID-symbols and C-symbols within any one pattern is
marked by the system when the pattern is created.
2.3.3 Evaluation of alignments
A combination of ID-symbols, derived from an alignment like the one shown
in Figure 1, can provide an abbreviated code for the entire sentence pattern
(or other pattern) held in New. A ‘good’ alignment is one where this code is
relatively small in terms of the number of bits of information that it contains.
The ‘compression score’ for an alignment is the difference between the size (in
bits) of the New pattern in its original form and its size after it has been encoded.
The procedure for deriving an encoding from an alignment is quite simple:
scan the alignment from left to right looking for columns containing a single
instance of an ID-symbol, not matched to any other symbol. The encoding is
simply the symbols that have been found by this procedure, in the same order
as they appear in the alignment. The encoding derived in this way from the
alignment in Figure 1 is ‘S SNG 0 3 2’. This is smaller than the New pattern in
terms of the number of symbols it contains. It is even smaller when the size of
the New pattern and the size of the code are measured in terms of the numbers
of bits they contain, as described in Wolff (2000).
The ‘compression score’ or ‘compression difference’ for an alignment is:
CD = No −Ne (1)
where No is the size (in bits) of the New pattern in its original form and Ne is
its size in bits after it has been encoded.
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2.4 Production of sentences and other patterns
An attractive feature of the SP system is that, without any modification, it can
support the production of language (or other patterns of knowledge) as well as
its analysis. If SP61 is run again, with the sentence in New replaced by the
encoded form of the sentence (‘S SNG 0 3 2’) as described in Section 2.3.3, the
best alignment found by the system is exactly the same as before except that
row 0 contains the encoded pattern and each symbol in that pattern aligned
with matching symbols in the rows below. The original sentence has, in effect,
been recreated because the alignment contains the words of the sentence in their
correct order. This is an example of the possibility noted near the beginning of
Section 2) where the roˆle of ‘New’ information is played by information within
the system rather than by sensory data.
It is envisaged that the production of sentences from meanings may be mod-
elled in a similar way. Instead of using a code pattern like ‘S SNG 0 3 2’ to drive
the production process, some kind of semantic structure may be used instead.
2.5 Unsupervised learning
The SP system as a whole is a system that learns by assimilating ‘raw’ infor-
mation from its environment and distilling the essence of that information by a
process of information compression. The main elements of the theory are now
realised in the SP70 computer model. This model is able to abstract simple
grammars from appropriate data without any kind of external ‘teacher’ or the
provision of ‘negative’ samples or the grading of samples from simple to complex
(cf. Gold, 1967). In short, it is an unsupervised model of learning. Some reor-
ganisation is needed to overcome certain weaknesses in the model as it stands
now.
Although some reorganisation is needed to overcome certain weaknesses in
SP70 as it stands now, the overall structure appears to be sound. In the model,
learning occurs in two stages:
1. Creation of Old patterns. As the system receives New patterns, a variety
of Old patterns are derived from them as explained below. Some of these
patterns are ‘good’ in terms of principles of minimum length encoding but
many of them are ‘bad’.
2. Selection of ‘good’ patterns. By a process of sifting and sorting through the
Old patterns, the system abstracts one or more subsets, each one of which
is relatively good in terms of the principles of minimum length encoding.
The patterns in the first one or two of these subsets may be retained and
the remaining patterns may be discarded.
It is envisaged that, in future versions of the model, these two processes—
creation of Old patterns and selection amongst them—will be repeated many
times while New patterns are being received so that the system can gradually
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bootstrap a set of Old patterns that are relatively useful for the economical
encoding of New data.
To get the flavour of the way in which Old patterns are created, consider
a simple example. If the current pattern in New is ‘t h e b o y r u n s’ and
the repository of Old patterns is empty, the system discovers that there is no
way to encode the New pattern economically in terms of Old information so
it augments the New pattern with ID symbols (which converts it into ‘< %1
t h e b o y r u n s >’) and adds the augmented pattern to Old. When Old
has accumulated a range of patterns like this, it can begin to create multiple
alignments. If, at that stage, the current pattern in New is ‘t h e g i r l r u n s’,
multiple alignments created by the system will include one like this:
0 t h e g i r l r u n s 0
| | | | | | |
1 < %1 t h e b o y r u n s > 1
From this alignment, the system can derive some additional Old patterns by ex-
tracting coherent sequences of matched symbols and unmatched symbols, adding
system-generated ID-symbols, and creating another pattern that ties everything
together.
In this case, the result is five patterns like this:
< %2 t h e >
< %3 r u n s >
< %4 0 b o y >
< %4 1 g i r l >
< %5 < %2 > < %4 > < %3 > >
The first four of these patterns represent words while the last one is an ‘abstract’
pattern that describes the overall structure of two original sentences in terms of
ID-symbols in the lower-level patterns.
Notice how ‘b o y’ and ‘g i r l’ have been assigned to the same class (identified
by the symbol ‘%4’), very much in the tradition of distributional linguistics (see,
for example, Harris, 1951; Fries, 1952).
Notice also how the system picks out entities that we naturally regard as ‘dis-
crete’ (see also Wolff, 1977, 1980; Brent, 1999). Similar principles may explain
how we learn to see the visual world in terms of discrete objects.
The flexible pattern matching that is built into the process of finding multiple
alignments means that SP70 can find correlations that bridge arbitrary amounts
of intervening structure. It is not necessary to restrict the learning process to
second- or third-order correlations (cf. Thompson (2000)).
2.6 Other aspects of perception and cognition
Apart from the parsing and production of language and the unsupervised learn-
ing of knowledge, the SP system has proved to be a versatile model of several
other aspects of perception and cognition:
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• Fuzzy pattern recognition and best-match retrieval of information. The
system provides a model for the way we can recognise things despite errors
of omission, commission and substitution and the way we can retrieve
information from fragmentary clues.
• Recognition at multiple levels of abstraction. Given appropriate patterns in
its store of Old information, the system can be used to model the recog-
nition of things at several different levels of abstraction simultaneously.
Some unknown entity may be recognised as an individual, ‘Tibs’, and at
the same time it may be recognised as a cat, a mammal, a vertebrate and
an animal (see also the example described at the end of Section 4.1).
• Probabilistic and exact forms of reasoning. The system supports prob-
abilistic ‘deduction’, abduction, nonmonotonic reasoning and chains of
reasoning. It also provides a model for classical ‘exact’ forms of reasoning.
• Solving problems by reasoning and by analogy. Given appropriate patterns,
the system can do such things as finding a route between two places or
solving problems by analogy.
Further information may be found in Wolff (2003a) and earlier publications
cited there.
2.7 ‘Identification’ and ‘Reference’ in the representation
and processing of knowledge
The SP system expresses a pair of ideas that are fundamental in the repre-
sentation and processing of knowledge and are one of the corner-stones of the
proposals in this paper:
• Identification. Any entity or concept may be given a ‘name’, ‘label’, ‘code’,
‘tag’ or identifier by which it may be identified. Examples in everyday life
include the name of a person, town, country, book, theorem, poem, type
of animal or plant, period of history, and many more.
The concept of identification is not restricted to unique identification of
specific things. It also applies to the identification of classes of things like
‘furniture’, ‘people’, ‘animals’ and so on
• Reference. Whenever we wish to refer to any such entity or class, we
can do so by means of a copy of the relevant name, label or identifier.
Every copy is a reference to the given entity or class and in each case
there may be many such references. Examples in everyday life include
referring to someone by their name, or referring to a town, country, book
etc by its name. In a paper like this one, ‘Hebb (1949)’ is a reference
to the bibliographic details at the end of the paper and those details are
themselves a reference to the book itself.
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Being able to refer to any concept by a relatively brief name is a great aid to
succinct communication. Imagine how cumbersome and difficult things would
be if we had to give a full description of everything and anything whenever we
wanted to talk about it—like the slow language of the Ents in Tolkien’s The Lord
of the Rings. Identification and reference are a powerful aid to the compression
of information and it should not surprise us to find that the same pair of ideas
lies at the heart of computer-based ‘ZIP’ programs for compressing information.
In the SP system, any given pattern has an identifier in the form of one or
more ID-symbols. One or more copies of those symbols in other patterns or in
the same pattern serve as references to that pattern. In Figure 1, the identifier
for the pattern ‘< NP < D > < N > >’ in row 7 are the symbols ‘<’ and ‘NP’
at the beginning of the pattern and the symbol ‘>’ at the end. A reference to
that pattern appears as ‘< NP >’ in the pattern ‘S Num ; < NP > < V >’ in
row 3. In a similar way, ‘< %2 >’ and ‘< %3 >’ in the pattern ‘< %5 < %2 >
< %4 > < %3 > >’ from Section 2.5 may be seen as references to ‘< %2 t h e
>’ and ‘< %3 r u n s >’, respectively, and ‘< %4 >’ is a reference to the class
{‘< %4 0 b o y >’,‘< %4 1 g i r l >’}.
3 Neural realisation of the SP concepts
This section describes how the SP concepts may be realised in terms of neu-
ral structures and processes. Much of the discussion in this section relates to
particular domains—mainly vision and language—but it should be emphasised
that the proposals are intended to apply to sensory data and knowledge of all
kinds—visual, auditory, tactile etc—both individually and in concert.
In this section and the rest of the paper, the focus will be on the analysis
of sensory data rather than the production of sentences or other patterns of
knowledge. In every figure, arrows on neural connections will show the direc-
tion of flow of sensory signals. A full discussion of the way the system may
model the creation or production of motor patterns is outside the scope of this
paper. In brief, it is envisaged that codes or ‘meanings’ may take on the roˆle
of New information as described in Section 2.4 and they may serve to create
neural analogues of multiple alignments by precisely the same processes that
are described in Section 3.4, below.
3.1 New patterns and symbols
Apart from the kinds of ‘internal’ data just mentioned, New information in
the SP system corresponds to sensory data. The discussion in this subsection
is mainly about vision but similar principles seem to apply to other sensory
modalities.
In mammalian vision, patterns of light entering the eye are received by the
retina and transmitted via the lateral geniculate body to layers 3 and 6 of the
visual cortex and beyond. Although sensory information is received initially
in analogue form, it is widely accepted that the information is converted at an
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early stage into something like David Marr’s (1982) concept of a ‘primal sketch’.
In the early stages, sensory data is converted into the digital language of on-
centre cells, off-centre cells and the like, and in later stages it is interpreted in
terms of digital features such as lines at particular angles, motion in a particular
direction, and so on (see, for example, Nicholls et al., 2001; Hubel, 2000).
Each neuron in the cortex that responds to a particular feature of the sensory
data may be regarded as the neural equivalent of an SP symbol and we shall
call it a neural symbol. An array of neural symbols that registers a sensory
pattern in any sensory cortex we shall call a receptor array. Whatever its three
dimensional configuration, we shall assume that it is topologically equivalent
to a one-dimensional sequence or a two-dimensional array. A receptor array
equates with the part of the SP system that receives New patterns from the
system’s environment and passes it on for processing within the system.
Notice that, if a receptor array is to respond to a wide variety of patterns—
which is clearly true of the visual cortex and other sensory cortices—then the
complete ‘alphabet’ of neural symbols must be available at every location within
the array and thus repeated many times across the receptor array as shown
schematically in Figure 3. In accordance with this expectation, it has been found
that—with the type of neuron that responds selectively to a short line segment
at a particular angle—the complete range of orientations is repeated across
the cortex within each of a large number of fairly small ‘orientation columns’
(Barlow, 1982; Hubel, 2000). It seems likely that a similar organisation may
exist in the somatosensory cortex, mirroring the way in which receptors that
respond selectively to heat, cold, touch, pressure and so on are repeated across
areas of the skin (Nicholls et al., 2001, Chapter 18).
ab c … a b c … a b c … a b c … a b c …
Early stages of sensory processing
To low-level pattern assemblies
Sensory data
Figure 3: Schematic representation of the repeating alphabet of neural symbols
in a receptor array (shown as repetitions of ‘a b c ...’). Also shown is the path
taken by sensory data through low-level sensory processing to the receptor array
and onwards to low-level pattern assemblies.
So far, we have assumed that a New pattern arrives all at once like an image
projected on to the retina. But it is clear that streams of sensory information
11
are being received in all sensory modalities throughout our lives and that we
are very sensitive to patterns in the temporal dimension within those streams of
information, especially in hearing. It is assumed here that temporal sequences
in hearing, vision and other modalities is captured spatially in arrays of neurons,
probably in the cortex.
3.2 Old patterns and symbols
An Old pattern in the SP system may be realised by a network of interconnected
cells in the cortex, similar to Donald Hebb’s (1949) concept of a cell assembly
(see also Hebb, 1958, pp. 103–107). Because there are significant differences be-
tween the present proposals and Hebb’s original concept, the neural realisation
of an Old pattern will be referred to as a pattern assembly. Those differences are
described in this subsection and ones that follow, and they are further discussed
in Section 4.
An SP symbol in an Old pattern may be realised within a pattern assembly
by a single neuron or, perhaps, a small network of interconnected neurons. To
simplify discussion in the rest of this paper, we shall assume that every symbol
is realised by a single neuron and, as before, we may refer to any such neuron
as a neural symbol. A neuron within a pattern assembly that corresponds to
a C-symbol within an SP pattern will be called a ‘C neural symbol’ or, more
simply, a C-neuron. Likewise, a neuron that represents an ID-symbol will be
called an ‘ID neural symbol’ or an ID-neuron.
As with receptor arrays, it is assumed that, regardless of the three-
dimensional configuration of the neurons in pattern assemblies, each such as-
sembly is topologically equivalent to a sequence of neurons or a two-dimensional
array of neurons.
Unlike the Hebbian concept of a cell assembly, it is envisaged that the neu-
rons in any one pattern assembly lie close together within the cortex. It is
envisaged that the connections between neurons will be two-way excitatory con-
nections mainly between immediate neighbours but there may also be excitatory
connections between neural symbols that are a little more distant. In general,
all the interconnections amongst neurons in a pattern assembly will be rela-
tively short. However, there will be connections between pattern assemblies as
described in Section 3.3 and those connections may be very much longer.
The suggested configuration of pattern assemblies just described is consis-
tent with Braitenberg’s (1978) suggestion (pp. 181-182) that there is strong
correlation of neural activity within each 1 mm column in the human cortex
and that each column may be connected to any other column. We may sup-
pose that each pattern assembly is confined within one column but connections
between pattern assemblies may span the whole cortex.
As with SP patterns, pattern assemblies may be roughly graded from ‘low
level’ to ‘high level’. Low level pattern assemblies are those representing small
perceptual details such as formant transitions and allophone in the case of speech
or small perceptual ‘motifs’ such as corners of objects, textures, or colour com-
binations in the case of vision. High level pattern assemblies would represent
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abstractions like the ‘sentence’ pattern in row 3 of Figure 1 or high-level classes
like ‘the world’, ‘people’ or ‘the animal kingdom’. As with SP patterns, the gra-
dation is not a strict hierarchy because any given pattern assembly may have a
direct connection to any other pattern assembly, not necessarily ones that are
immediately ‘above’ or ‘below’.
3.3 Connections
It is envisaged that each neural symbol within a receptor array sends signals
to one or more C-neurons in one or more pattern assemblies. Most of these
would be pattern assemblies that may be classified as low level but in principle
any pattern assembly may receive signals from a receptor array. Connections
leaving the neural symbols of a receptor array are shown at the top of Figure 3.
Each C-neuron within each pattern assembly may receive signals from one
or more receptor arrays or from one or more pattern assemblies or from both
kinds of structure. Normally, these signals would come from lower level struc-
tures but in principle any one pattern assembly may receive signals from any
of the entire set of pattern assemblies, including itself. Each ID-neuron within
each pattern assembly may send signals to one or more C-neurons. Normally,
these signals would go to higher level structures but in principle any one pat-
tern assembly may send signals to any of the entire set of pattern assemblies,
including itself. These kinds of interconnections amongst pattern assemblies are
shown schematically in Figure 4, following the conventions shown in the legend
to the figure.
An aspect of the proposals that is not illustrated in the figure is that there
will be low level pattern assemblies representing structures in every sensory
modality—vision, hearing, touch etc—and high-level pattern assemblies may
receive inputs from any of these lower level pattern assemblies. In this way,
any high-level concept like ‘person’ may be described in terms of all the rel-
evant sensory modalities. In many cases, the connections that are needed to
bring diverse sensory modalities together in this way will be relatively long, as
previously indicated.
An important feature of the connections between a receptor array and a
pattern assembly and the connections between pattern assemblies is that the
symbols at each end of every connection are always a match for each other. In
effect, the roˆle of each C-neuron is defined by its inputs. For example, the neural
symbol ‘a’ in the pattern assembly ‘< Nstem 3 c a t >’ in Figure 4 may be seen to
represent ‘a’ because it receives inputs from other neural symbols that represent
‘a’. Because the roˆle of each C-neuron within each pattern assembly is defined in
this way, it is not necessary to provide a repeated alphabet of symbols at each
location within each pattern assembly like the repeated alphabet of symbols
that is necessary at each location of a receptor array (Section 3.1). In a similar
way, the roˆle of each ID-neuron is defined by the pattern assemblies to which it
connects.
The fact that connections between two pattern assemblies are always be-
tween symbols that match each other means that the proposed system of inter-
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Tohigher-level pattern assemblies
From lower-level pattern assemblies
and/or receptor arrays
NP D N >>>< < <
h >e< tD 0
Nr >< N Ns ><
>< 3Nr c a t
Figure 4: Schematic representation of inter-connections amongst pattern assem-
blies. Envelopes with broken lines are pattern assemblies and envelopes with
unbroken lines are neurons. Arrows show the direction of flow of sensory signals.
ID-neurons (apart from those representing brackets) are larger than C-neurons
and contain oblique characters. Not shown in the figure are lateral connections
within each pattern assembly and inhibitory connections as described in Section
3.4.
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connections amongst pattern assemblies provides a neural realisation of the re-
lationship between identification and reference, as described in Section 2.7. For
example, the symbols ‘< D >’ in the pattern ‘< NP < D > < N > >’ in Figure
4 are connected to the matching symbols in the pattern ‘< D 0 t h e >’ and it is
envisaged that there would be similar connections to other patterns representing
words in the grammatical class of ‘determiners’. Thus ‘< D >’, as a reference
to that grammatical class, has neural connections to patterns that represent the
class.
It will be convenient to use the term neural reference for one or more neurons
that is the neural equivalent of a reference, as described in Section 2.7.
3.4 Creating neural analogues of multiple alignments
Given a structure of receptor arrays, pattern assemblies and their interconnec-
tions as described so far, how can it function to identify the neural equivalent
of one or two ‘good’ multiple alignments like the one shown in Figure 1?
It is envisaged that each pattern assembly will respond to incoming stimu-
lation in a manner that is functionally coherent and similar to the responses of
an individual neuron. Below a certain threshold, there will be relatively little
response amongst neurons in the pattern assembly. But when inputs exceed the
threshold, the pattern assembly will ‘fire’ and all the neurons in the assembly
will become active together (‘ignition’ as described by Pulvermu¨ller (2002b)).
It is envisaged that the neural equivalent of a multiple alignment will be
identified when each of its pattern assemblies and the connections between them
are relatively active as suggested by the connections shown with unbroken lines
in Figure 4. Other pattern assemblies and other connections will be relatively
quiet, as suggested by the connections shown with broken lines in the same
figure.
It seems possible that there may also be a system of inhibitory connec-
tions amongst pattern assemblies—perhaps mediated by structures below the
cortex—that would dampen down excessive neural activity (Milner, 1957) and
would have the effect of forcing a decision amongst competing alternatives so
that the ‘winner takes all’. A mechanism of that sort operates in the innerva-
tion of the Basilar membrane, where position along the length of the membrane
encodes the frequency of sound and lateral inhibition has the effect of strength-
ening the response where the signal is strongest whilst suppressing the response
in neighbouring regions (von Be´ke´sy, 1967).
Another mechanism that may help to prevent excessive excitation of pat-
tern assemblies are inhibitory connections amongst the input fibres to pattern
assemblies, as described in Section 3.4.1, next.
3.4.1 Keeping track of order in perception
As the system has been described so far, a stimulus like ‘b o y’ would produce
the same level of response in a pattern assembly like ‘< N 2 y o b >’ as it would
in a pattern assembly like ‘< N 3 b o y >’. In other words, there is nothing
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in what has been proposed to keep track of the ordering or arrangement of
elements in a pattern.
Our ability to recognise patterns despite some jumbling of their elements
(e.g., solving anagrams) is consistent with the scheme that has been described.
But the fact that we can see the difference between an anagram and its solution
shows that something else is needed. Some kind of mechanism is required to
distinguish between two kinds of situation:
(a) Fibres leave a pattern assembly or one portion of a receptor array and
arrive together, in the same relative positions, at one portion of another
pattern assembly. Fibres that conform to this rule will be described as
coherent.
(b) Fibres arrive at one portion of a pattern assembly from a variety of differ-
ent sources or, if they come from one source, their relative positions are
not preserved. This kind of arrangement will be described as incoherent.
When signals arrive at a pattern assembly, they should produce a stronger
response in the first case than in the second. A possible mechanism to ensure
that this happens would be lateral connections amongst the fibres of a coherent
bundle that would have the effect of increasing the rate of firing in the bundle
if the majority of them are firing together. When any one fibre in the bundle is
firing, then signals will be carried to neighbouring fibres via the lateral connec-
tions and these signals should lower the threshold for firing and thus increase
the rate of firing in any of the neighbouring fibres that are already firing. An
alternative scheme that should achieve the same effect is inhibitory connections
amongst fibres that are incoherent.
If signals arrive in a temporal sequence, then other possible mechanisms
include ‘synfire chains’ and temporal ‘sequence detectors’, as described by
Pulvermu¨ller (2002a,b). However, these appear to be less suitable for keeping
track of order in spatially-distributed visual patterns, seen in a single glance.
3.5 Learning
It is envisaged that learning in SP-neural would occur in a manner that is similar
to SP70 (Section 2.5):
• When there is a good match between sensory patterns and stored pattern
assemblies, the sensory data will be encoded in terms of those pattern
assemblies much as in Section 2.3.3. But if there is no good match for
sensory data or only a partial match, then new pattern assemblies may be
created like the patterns described in Section 2.5.
• The creation of a new pattern assembly is unlikely to mean growing new
neurons from scratch. Although there is evidence that new nerve cells can
grow in mature brains (Shors et al., 2001), it seems likely that the bulk of
neurons in the brain are present at birth and that the creation of a new
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pattern assembly is largely a process of assigning pre-existing neurons to
it, with the creation or breaking of connections as outlined below.
• Associated with each pattern assembly will be some physiological analogue
of the frequency measure associated with each SP pattern—counting the
number of times each pattern assembly has been recognised in sensory in-
puts. Pattern assemblies that have been frequently recognised should have
a lower threshold for excitation or should be otherwise more responsive to
incoming stimulation.
• Periodically, pattern assemblies may be evaluated in terms of their use-
fulness for encoding sensory data. Those that are proving useful may be
retained and those that are not proving useful may be purged. The purg-
ing of a pattern assembly would not mean the literal destruction of the
neurons in the assembly. It would be largely a matter of breaking the
connections with other pattern assemblies so that the neurons in the pat-
tern assembly can be made available for later re-use in some other pattern
assembly.
With regard to the making and breaking of connections, the lateral con-
nections amongst the neural symbols of a new pattern assembly may already
be in place before it is created and the new assembly may be brought into
existence by the relatively simple process of breaking connections at the bound-
aries. Something like this is suggested by evidence for the progressive weak-
ening of connections between cells that do not normally fire at the same time
(Pulvermu¨ller, 1999, pp. 254–255) except that, in the present proposal, connec-
tions at the boundaries would be broken completely when a pattern assembly
is first created. We shall return to this and related points in Section 4.3.
Each new pattern assembly would also need appropriate connections with
receptor arrays and other pattern assemblies. At first sight, this suggests the
growing of new fibres, many of which would be quite long. It is much more
plausible to suppose, as Hebb suggested, that there are pre-established long
connections between different parts of the cortex and that new connections are
established by the growth of short connecting links to the main connections
(much as a new telephone may normally be installed without the necessity of
laying a new cable all the way to the exchange).
It may not even be necessary to postulate the growth of short links. It is
possible that pre-existing links could be switched on or off somehow according
to need. Something like this might enable us to account for the speed with
which we can establish memories for names, faces, events and so on (see Section
4.3, below).
4 Discussion and evaluation
This section considers a selection of issues in the evaluation of the SP-neural pro-
posals as they relate to empirical phenomena and alternative proposals, mainly
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Hebb’s (1949) original concept of a ‘cell assembly’ and versions of that concept
that have been proposed subsequently. To avoid terminological confusion, I will
use the term ‘cell assembly’ for all versions of that concept (including pattern
assemblies) unless a particular version is the focus of interest.
4.1 Parts, wholes, classes and associations
Hebb (1949) proposed that cell assemblies could become associated and that
assemblies that are associated might eventually merge to become a single assem-
bly. He also envisaged an hierarchical organisation for conceptual structures and
the possibility that low-level concepts (and their corresponding cell assemblies)
might be shared by two or more higher-level concepts (and their corresponding
cell assemblies) (see also Hebb, 1958, pp. 103–107).
In this connection, Milner (1996) raises some pertinent questions:
“How do associations between cell assemblies differ from internal
associations that are responsible for the assemblies’ properties? It
does not seem likely that both these processes can be the result of
similar synaptic changes as is usually assumed. If they were, the
interassembly associations would soon become intraassembly loops.
A related puzzle is that parts are not submerged in the whole. Doors
and windows are integral parts of my concept of a house, but they
are also robust, stand-alone concepts.” (p. 71).
Later on the same page he writes: “Perhaps the toughest problem of all concerns
the fact that we have many associations with almost every engram....The brain
must be a veritable rat’s nest of tangled associations, yet for the most part we
navigate through it with ease.”
Hebb (1958) provides a possible answer to the way in which parts may be
distinguished from wholes:
“If two assemblies A and B are repeatedly active at the same time
they will tend to become ‘associated,’ so that A excites B and vice
versa. If they are always active at the same time they will tend
to merge in a single systems—that is, form a single assembly—but
if they are also active at different times they will remain separate
(but associated) systems. (This means that exciting part of A, for
example, has a very high probability of exciting all of A, but a
definitely lower probability of exciting a separate assembly, B; A
may be able to excite B only when some other assembly, C, also
facilitates activity in B).” (p. 105).
This may be part of the answer but it does not get to the bottom of the problem.
There is a need to recognise that sharing of structures can be done in three
distinct ways as illustrated in Figure 5 and described here:
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• Literal sharing. The neurons in the lower-level cell assembly (‘A’ in the
figure) are also part of two or more higher-level cell assemblies (‘B’ and
‘C’ in the figure).
• Sharing by reference. The lower-level cell assembly (‘A’) is outside the
higher-level cell assemblies (‘B’ and ‘C’) but each of the latter contains
one or more neurons (shown in the figure as a single neuron marked with
a small ‘A’) that serves as a proxy, agent or representative for the lower-
level cell assembly and is connected to that assembly. The proxy is a
neural reference, as described in Section 3.3—functionally equivalent to
the concept of a reference described in Section 2.7.
If sharing of structures is always achieved in this way—as proposed in this
paper—then any one neuron belongs in one cell assembly and only one
cell assembly.
• Sharing by copying. In each of two or more higher-level cell assemblies
(‘B’ and ‘C’) there is a copy of the lower-level cell assembly (‘A’). As with
sharing by reference, there is no need to postulate that any one neuron
may belong in two or more cell assemblies.
It is reasonably clear that Hebb and all subsequent authors have not intended
the third sense in which cell assemblies might share structure. Although it may
have a roˆle in some aspects of cognition, I shall say no more about it in this
paper.
With regard to the first two senses in which cell assemblies may share
structure, they have not to my knowledge been clearly differentiated either
in Hebb’s writings or in any other writings about cell assemblies. Hebb’s de-
scriptions of the cell assembly concept imply that any one neuron may belong
in two or more cell assemblies—in accordance with the first sense of structure
sharing. This seems to be generally accepted by people writing later and it
has often been made explicit (see, for example, Palm (1982, p. 216), Huyck
(2001, p. 385), Pulvermu¨ller (1999, pp. 257–258), Sakurai (1998, p. 213) and
Gardner-Medwin and Barlow (2001)).
But as a means of representing conceptual structures and their inter-
relations, literal sharing is problematic. For example, it is difficult to see why
assemblies B and C in the top part of Figure 5 should not simply merge into
a single cell assembly. Perhaps more serious is the problem of keeping track of
the relative positions or ordering of shared components in two or more configu-
rations.
Consider a pack of playing cards containing the Ace, King, Queen and Jack
of Clubs, all together and in that order. This configuration may be represented
within a cell assembly as shown in part (a) of Figure 6. Here, each card is
represented by a cell assembly and the order of the cards within the pack is
shown by connections between those cell assemblies.
As it stands, the representation is unambiguous. But we run into difficulties
if, using literal sharing of structures, we try to add a representation of the
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Sharingby reference
B C
A
A A
Literal sharing A
B C
Sharing by copying
B
A1
C
A2
Figure 5: Three possible ways in which a low-level cell assembly (‘A’) may
be shared by two higher-level cell assemblies (‘B’ and ‘C’). Cell assemblies are
enclosed with broken-line envelopes and neurons are shown with unbroken lines.
pack after it has been shuffled. Part (b) of Figure 6 shows the result if the
same four cards fall together in the pack but in the order Queen, Ace, Jack
and King. The addition of connections to represent that order causes the whole
structure to become ambiguous. If the connections are non-directional, the Ace,
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AC
KC
QC
JC
(a)
AC
KC
QC
JC
(b)
Figure 6: Representing two orderings using literal sharing. (a) Part of a cell
assembly representing four playing cards and their order within a deck of cards
before it has been shuffled. (b) As in (a) but with the addition of connections
showing a new order for the same four cards after the pack has been shuffled.
Key: ‘A’ = Ace, ‘K’ = King, ‘Q’ = Queen, ‘J’ = Jack, ‘C’ = Clubs. Each playing
card is itself represented by a cell assembly shown as a broken-line circle.
for example, may be followed immediately by any of the other three cards. And
even if directional links are allowed, the Ace may be followed immediately by
the King or the Jack.
The problem can be overcome if, instead of using literal sharing of structures,
we use sharing by reference. Parts (a) and (b) of Figure 7 each show how an
ordering of the playing cards may be represented unambiguously by a sequence
of neurons, each one of which is a neural reference to a cell assembly for the
corresponding card (shown in the middle of the figure).4
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(b)
Figure 7: Representing two orderings using sharing by reference. (a) Part of
a cell assembly representing a pack of playing cards before shuffling. Four C-
neurons are shown, each of which serves as a neural reference to a cell assembly
in the middle of the figure representing one playing card. (b) Part of a cell
assembly representing the same pack of cards after shuffling. As before, four
C-neurons are shown and each one serves as a neural reference to one of the
cell assemblies in the middle of the figure. The abbreviations are the same as
in Figure 6.
Neural references also provide a neat solution to the other problems raised
by Milner:
• Associations between pattern assemblies may be encoded by building a
new pattern assembly containing neural references to the pattern assem-
blies that are to be associated. These associations are then internal to
the new pattern assembly and the original pattern assemblies retain their
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identity.
• In a similar way, there can be a stand-alone cell assembly for each com-
ponent of a house while the assembly for the house itself comprises a
collection of neural references to the components. In this way, the concept
of a house does not become muddled with concepts for doors, windows
etc.
• It is true that there must be a ‘rat’s nest’ of associations in the brain but
neural references allow these to be encoded in a way that does not disturb
the integrity of each concept. The coherence of a web page is not affected
by links to that page from other pages and it makes no difference how
many such pointers or references there may be.
Some of the power of sharing by reference can be seen in Figure 8. The figure
shows a hierarchy of classes from the relatively abstract ‘animal’ (‘A’ near the
bottom of the figure), via ‘vertebrate’ (‘V’), ‘mammal’ (‘M’), ‘cat’ (‘C’), to a
specific cat ‘Tibs’ shown near the top of the figure. At the same time, the figure
shows the part-whole relations between each class and the descriptive elements
of the class. In a more elaborate example, these elements may themselves be
broken down into a hierarchy of parts and subparts. As previously noted, arrows
on the connections between pattern assemblies show the direction of flow of
sensory signals.
In the figure, each C-neuron in the body of a pattern assembly functions
as a proxy for or neural reference to the pattern assembly from which it re-
ceives sensory signals. The whole structure achieves the effect of ‘inheritance’
in an object-oriented system: the individual cat called ‘Tibs’ inherits the fea-
ture ‘purrs’ from the ‘cat’ pattern assembly, the features ‘suckles young’ and
‘furry’ are inherited from the ‘mammal’ pattern assembly, ‘backbone’ is inher-
ited from the ‘vertebrate’ assembly, and ‘eats’ and ‘breathes’ are inherited from
the ‘animal’ pattern assembly.
4.1.1 Temporal correlations?
An alternative to the foregoing is to suppose that cell assemblies may form
hierarchies and other kinds of structure by temporal correlations amongst their
neurons: “A set of units can be bound into a block by synchronising their
fast activity fluctuations. Several such blocks can coexist if their activity is
desynchronised relative to each other ...” (von der Malsburg, 1987, p. 15) and
“To represent that Attribute A is bound to Attribute B and Attribute C to
Attribute D, the cells for A and B fire in synchrony, the cells for C and D
fire in synchrony, and the AB set fires out of synchrony with the CD set.”
(Hummel and Biederman, 1992, p. 485).
Ideas of this kind—reviewed by Bienenstock and Geman (1995)—are clearly
very different from the SP-neural proposals but there is insufficient space here
for any kind of weighing of the pros and cons.
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A …
AV …
VM …
purrs
barks
tabby whitebib
D …M
suckles young
furry
backbone
eats breathes
Tibs …C
…MC
Figure 8: An example showing how pattern assemblies with neural references
between them can represent class-inclusion relations and part-whole relations.
Key: ‘C’ = cat, ‘D’ = dog, ‘M’ = mammal, ‘V’ = vertebrate, ‘A’ = animal,
‘...’ = further structure that would be shown in a more comprehensive example.
The conventions are the same as in Figure 4 except that brackets have been
omitted to simplify the figure and neurons are not shown in the lower-level
pattern assemblies.
4.2 Cardinal cells
ID-neurons in the present proposals are similar to the ‘cardinal cells’ described
by Barlow (1972), except that there may be more than one for each concept.
Constructs such as neural reference and multiple alignment are also distinctive
in the present proposals. The chief objection to the idea of cardinal cells is that,
if ‘grandmother’ is represented by a single cell, we will not be able to access our
knowledge of her if that cell dies. But as Barlow points out, a small amount of
replication will give considerable protection against this kind of catastrophe. As
suggested in Section 3.2, each neural symbol may be a small cluster of neurons
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rather than a single neuron. Another possibility is that all our concepts are
replicated two or three times in the brain. Arguments and calculations that
would take too much space to reproduce here suggest that, with the SP-neural
scheme for representing knowledge, this kind of replication is feasible.
4.3 Learning
Hebb’s proposals for learning are summarised in his much-quoted suggestion
that:
“When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and
repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process
or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A’s
efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased.” (Hebb, 1949, p.
62).
This idea forms the basis for learning in many varieties of artificial neural net-
work. Apart from the elegant simplicity of the idea, another possible reason for
its popularity is that it accords with statistical models of learning where two
things need to co-occur with a relatively high frequency before the association
between them can be seen to be significant. And the Hebbian view of learning
is broadly in accordance with the slow build up of our knowledge throughout
childhood and beyond.
And yet this view of learning is in direct conflict with everyday observations
of what we can and do learn from a single occurrence or experience. If we are
involved in some kind of accident which does not cause us to lose consciousness,
we can remember the sequence of events and recount them with little difficulty.
A possible objection here is that, where strong emotions are involved, we may
rehearse our memories many times and thus strengthen the links amongst the
corresponding cell assemblies. But the same objection carries much less force
if we are asked to recall things that carry less emotional charge. On any given
evening, we normally have no difficulty in recalling the humdrum events of the
day and this without any apparent rehearsal.
Because the slow growth of cell assemblies does not account for our ability
to remember things immediately after a single exposure, Hebb adopted a ‘rever-
beratory’ theory for this kind of memory. But, as Milner (1996) points out, it
is difficult to understand how this kind of mechanism could explain our ability
to assimilate a previously-unseen telephone number. Each digit in the number
may be stored in a reverberatory assembly but this does not explain how we
remember the sequence of digits in the number.
In the learning scheme outlined in Sections 2.5 and 3.5, new pattern assem-
blies can be created in response to a single sensory input. This is consistent with
our ability to remember unique events and sequences of events. And, if we sup-
pose that synapses can be switched on or off in seconds or fractions of a second
according to need, we may be able to account for the speed with which immedi-
ate memories can be established. This model for short-term memory does not
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suffer from the weakness in the reverberatory model that Milner identified: we
may remember the sequence of digits in a telephone number by creating a new
pattern assembly that represents the number.
But an ability to lay down new pattern assemblies relatively quickly does not
explain why it takes several years to learn something like a language. The prin-
ciples on which SP70 is based suggest why learning a language, and similar kinds
of learning, take quite a lot of time. The abstract ‘space’ of alternative gram-
mars for any natural language is astronomically large and, even using heuristic
techniques like those in the SP models, it takes time to search amongst the
many possibilities. Finding a tolerably good grammar for any natural language
is a very complex problem and it cannot be solved in an instant.
4.4 Constancies
A possible objection to the SP-neural proposals is that they are inconsistent
with the ‘constancy’ phenomena in perception. These include:
• Size constancy. We can recognise an object despite wide variations in the
size of its image on the retina—and we judge its size to be constant despite
these variations.
• Brightness constancy. We can recognise something despite wide variations
in the absolute brightness of the image on our retina (and, likewise, we
judge its intrinsic brightness to be constant).
• Colour constancy. In recognising the intrinsic colour of an object, we can
make allowances for wide variations in the colour of the light which falls
on the object and the consequent effect on the colour of the light that
leaves the object and enters our eyes.
If the pattern recorded in a receptor array was merely a copy of sensory
input there would indeed be wide variations in the size of the visual pattern
projected by a given object and similar variations in brightness and colours.
The suggestion here is that much of the variability of sensory input from a
given object has been eliminated at a stage before the information reaches the
receptor array. Lateral inhibition in the retina emphasises boundaries between
relatively uniform areas. The redundant information within each uniform area
is largely eliminated which means that it is, in effect, shrunk to the minimum
size needed to record the attributes of that area. Since this minimum will be
the same regardless of the size of the original image, the overall effect should be
to reduce or eliminate variations in the sizes of images from a given object.
In a similar way, the ‘primal sketch’ created by lateral inhibition should be
largely independent of the absolute brightness of the original image—because
it is a distillation of changes within an image, independent of absolute values.
And adaptation in the early stages of visual processing should to a large ex-
tent prevent variations in brightness having an effect on patterns reaching the
receptor array.
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Edwin Land’s ‘retinex’ theory suggests that colour constancy is achieved by
processing in the retina and in the visual cortex (see Nicholls et al., 2001, pp.
437–439). This is consistent with the idea that this source of variability has
been removed at a stage before sensory input is compared with stored patterns.
4.5 Stimulus equivalence and discrimination
An important motivation for the cell assembly concept was to explain the phe-
nomenon of ‘stimulus equivalence’ or ‘generalization’—our ability to recognise
things despite variations in size, shape, position of the image on the retina,
and so on. However, Milner (1996) writes that “Generalization is certainly an
important and puzzling phenomenon, but discrimination is equally important
and tends to be ignored in theories of neural representation. Any theory of en-
gram formation must take into account the relationship between category and
instance—the ability we have to distinguish our own hat, house, and dog from
hats, houses and dogs in general.” (p. 70).
Both stimulus equivalence and discrimination can be explained in terms of
SP-neural. The theory accounts for generalization in four main ways:
• The way in which perceptual constancies may be accommodated in the
present proposals was considered in Section 4.4.
• As with the original cell assembly concept, a pattern assembly can respond
provided a reasonably large subset of its neurons has received inputs. This
seems to accommodate our ability to recognise things despite omissions,
additions or substitutions in sensory inputs.
• In the present scheme, each neuron or feature detector in a receptor array
is connected to each one of the pattern assemblies (mainly low level assem-
blies) that contain the corresponding feature. Thus, each of these pattern
assemblies may respond to appropriate input regardless of the position of
the input on the receptor array.
• Owing to the provision of neural references in the present proposals, it
is possible to create pattern assemblies that represent abstractions from
sensory input. An example from Figure 4 is the pattern assembly ‘< NP
< D > < N > >’. This pattern assembly represents the abstract structure
of a noun phrase via references to the class of determiners (‘< D >’) and
the class of nouns (‘< N >’). It may be activated by a range of alternative
inputs: any noun phrase that conforms to the determiner-noun pattern.
The SP theory provides a neat account of our ability to distinguish specific
instances from the categories in which they belong. As mentioned in Section
2.6, the SP system can build multiple alignments which include several differ-
ent levels of abstraction, including a level that represents a specific instance.
Examples may be seen in Wolff (2003a) and earlier publications. The way in
which a hierarchy of classes (including a specific instance) may be represented
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in SP-neural is illustrated in the example described at the end of Section 4.1
(Figure 8).
4.6 Natural language
One of the strengths of the SP system is its ability to represent syntactic struc-
tures of natural languages and to process them in the parsing and production of
sentences (Wolff, 2000, 2003a). Although SP-neural is not complete, it already
suggests solutions to the challenges for any neural theory of language processing
that have been identified by Pulvermu¨ller (2002b, pp. 144–146):
(a) How can centre-embedded sequences such as ‘ABCC′B′A′’ be
represented?5
(b) How can discontinuous constituents and distributed words be realised
(e.g., switch ... on)?
(c) How is it possible to specify the syntactic relatedness of distant elements
in a string (e.g., noun and verb agreement)?
(d) How can repeated use of the same word or lexical category within a sen-
tence be modelled and stored? A related question is how recursive struc-
tures might be modelled and stored?
(e) How can lexical categories—such as ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘adjective’—be re-
alised in a neuronal network?
The answers suggested here have similarities to and differences from those
proposed by Pulvermu¨ller in chapters 8 to 12 (ibid.). There is insufficient space
here for a detailed comparison so I will merely outline the way in which these
questions may be answered in SP-neural.
The concept of neural reference provides a key to all five questions. SP-
neural suggests that questions (a), (b), (d) and (e) may be answered in a way
that is a close analogue of the organisation of a context-free phrase-structure
grammar, while the ‘context sensitive’ feature of the SP theory (Section 2.3.1)
may provide an answer to question (c).
Figure 9 shows how, using neural references, ‘B ... B′’ may be embedded in
‘A ... A′’ and how ‘C ... C′’ may be embedded in ‘B ... B′’.
In a similar way, the ‘embedding’ of a noun-phrase pattern assembly within
an assembly representing the phrase switch ... on may be achieved by means of
a neural reference to the noun phrase placed between switch and on, as shown
in Figure 10.
This figure also shows how grammatical categories such as ‘determiner’ (‘D’)
and ‘noun’ (‘N’) may be represented in SP-neural. The pattern assembly rep-
resenting the structure of a noun phrase contains neural references to each of
these categories and each neural reference is connected to pattern assemblies
representing the members of the category.
28
A A´1 2
B B´2 3
C C´3 4
Figure 9: Pattern assemblies and connections between them showing how centre-
embedding may be modelled in SP-neural. In this and the remaining figures,
the conventions are the same as in Figure 8.
Figure 11 shows how a noun phrase (‘NP’) may be repeated within a sentence
by the provision of two neural references to a pattern assembly representing the
structure of a noun phrase. The repetition is expressed by the neural references,
not by the structure itself.
And Figure 12 shows how the recursion in phrases like the very very ... fast
car may be represented in SP-neural. The first of the two pattern assemblies
identified as ‘X’ contains a neural reference to itself and this expresses the recur-
sive nature of ‘very ...’. Notice that, for the production of language but perhaps
not for the analysis of language, it is also necessary to provide a ‘null’ member
of the ‘X’ category—so that it is possible to escape from the recursive loop.
These pattern assemblies are close analogues of the rules in a phrase-structure
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1 NP
switch
on
NP D N
D this
D that
N kettle
N engine
NP it
NP them
Figure 10: Pattern assemblies and connections between them showing how dis-
continuous structures may be modelled in SP-neural.
grammar that would be needed to describe this kind of language structure.
The suggested answer to question (c) within SP-neural hinges on the abil-
ity of the SP system to represent and process long-distance dependencies as
indicated in Section 2.3.1 (see also Wolff, 2000, 2003a). It is envisaged that
pattern assemblies representing grammatical structures may include ones like
the pattern shown in row 8 of Figure 1. This pattern expresses the idea that,
within a sentence, a singular noun in the ‘subject’ position must be followed by
a singular verb in the position of the main verb. There will also be a similar pat-
tern representing plural dependencies. It is envisaged that, within SP-neural,
these pattern assemblies will exert their influence in much the same way as the
corresponding patterns in the SP system.
5 Conclusion
The broad outlines of SP-neural are reasonably clear but there are still several
areas of uncertainty in the details. If this neural version of the SP theory can
be completed satisfactorily, then it will inherit all the considerable explanatory
force of the SP theory in several areas of perception and cognition including the
way diverse forms of knowledge may be represented and integrated, the analysis
and production of language, fuzzy recognition of objects, recognition at multiple
levels of abstraction, retrieval of memories from fragmentary clues, various forms
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NP D N
D this N boy
N girl
S NP NPV
V loves
V hates
D that
Figure 11: Pattern assemblies and connections between them showing how re-
peated structures may be modelled in SP-neural.
NP D NX A
D the
A fast
N car
X NULLX X
very
Figure 12: Pattern assemblies and connections between them showing how re-
cursion may be modelled in SP-neural.
of probabilistic reasoning and exact reasoning, unsupervised learning, and the
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solving of problems by reasoning and by analogy.
Even though SP-neural is not complete, it already offers useful insights into
the kinds of structures and functions that we may expect to find in brains
and nervous systems. The theory makes a number of predictions that are, in
principle, falsifiable although they represent a considerable challenge for current
techniques and technologies. The main predictions of the theory are these:
• As in Hebb’s theory and other theories in that tradition, SP-neural
proposes that knowledge is stored in functionally-coherent and inter-
connected assemblies of neurons in the cortex. However, the theory is
distinctive in most of the points that follow.
• It is proposed that any one neuron belongs in one pattern assembly and
only one assembly.
• It is envisaged that, while there may be long connections between pat-
tern assemblies, the neurons within any one assembly lie close together
within the cortex, perhaps confined to one column, with short connec-
tions between them, mainly between immediate neighbours. These are
not a necessary part of the proposals but they seem likely.
• Relationships amongst pattern assemblies, including part-whole relations,
class-inclusion relations and associations between pattern assemblies, are
mediated by the use of neurons that are functionally equivalent to refer-
ences between structures, as described in the text.
• When sensory information is received, recognition of patterns and objects
is achieved by the excitation of pattern assemblies and connections be-
tween them in a manner that is functionally equivalent to the creation of
multiple alignments in the SP theory.
• There may be inhibitory connections between assemblies to dampen exces-
sive excitation and sharpen competition between assemblies. Inhibitory
connections between afferent fibres may help to preserve information about
the order of features or events in sensory inputs.
• It is proposed that learning is achieved by the creation of pattern as-
semblies and selection amongst them, in the same way that patterns are
created and selected in the SP theory. Assemblies can be created and
destroyed by the making and breaking of short connections, as described
in text.
• To record short-term memories, pattern assemblies may be created within
seconds or fractions of a second, perhaps by the activation and de-
activation of pre-existing synaptic connections.
Finding direct neurophysiological evidence that may confirm of confute these
predictions is not likely to be easy but the proposals in this paper may suggest
new avenues for investigation. Uncertainties in the theory need to be resolved,
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ideally by observations of brain structure and functioning. Meanwhile, computer
simulation techniques may help to shape the theory.
Notes
1In both cases, recursive self-referencing is also possible, as discussed in Section 4.6.
2An umbrella term for ‘minimum message length encoding’ and ‘minimum description
length encoding’.
3No attempt will be made in this paper to consider at any length how we may encode
our knowledge of the three-dimensional shapes of objects or the arrangement of objects in
three-dimensional space. It is conceivable that 3D information might be encoded with 3D
patterns but in biological terms, this may not make good sense. Given the predominantly
two-dimensional nature of the retina and the cortex, it is more plausible to suppose that we
encode our knowledge of three dimensional structures using two-dimensional patterns in the
manner of plans and elevations used by architects and engineers.
4I am grateful to Daniel Wolff for suggesting the pack-of-cards example.
5Center embedding seems to be a genuine phenomenon in language even though most
people can only cope with one or two levels of embedding.
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